Work History

My first tour as an officer was at the Foreign Technology Division.  Having no work assignments while waiting for Top Secret security clearance, I became aware of the need for a computer simulation of Antiaircraft Artillery site action against our aircraft.  I produced that program and it was used by Strategic Air Command to plan B52 actions over North Viet Nam.  After receiving Top Secret SCI clearances, I performed space systems intelligence tasks.  These involved planning electronic coverage with the National Security Agency (NSA) and coordinating intelligence assessments with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  I also participated in field human intelligence (HUMINT) operations overseas. I briefed intelligence assessments to the commander of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other offices up to the Secretary of the Air Force.

I was transferred to the AF Flight Dynamics Lab in 1972. I was assigned to do wind tunnel testing. I quickly recognized that two problems were preventing effective testing. First, data was recorded by two systems. One seldom worked. The other always ran but produced totally unreliable data. Second, two companies were used to build wind tunnel models. One did shoddy work. The other purposely blew the budget and the schedule to increase profits on the time and materials contract. Both areas were under the control of a single supervisor who was very difficult to deal with. Other testers had been doing the best they could to work around the problem for many years. I refused to let the problem individual stand in the way of the solution. I identified, got funding approval for, and managed the purchase of a replacement data recording (and analysis) computer. (It was 3 months from problem identification to first use of the new system.) The problem individual was removed from supervision of data gathering. For model development, I designed my own models and got them built by machinists on base. Soon all testers were getting models built that way.  In my four year tour, I completed nine major tests.  Most test engineers did two in four years.

Assigned to Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), Remotely Piloted Vehicle / Air Launched Strategic Missiles Program Office (RPV/ALSM ) in 1976, I was assigned to an entirely new job - acquisition program control. I was assigned to support the SRAM B program. Another officer had developed a program review system for the ALCM program and it was well regarded.  I was asked to set up the same process for SRAM.  For ALCM, the program control officer ran the review and the only structure was a problem list for various areas. I built the SRAM system differently. I built initial schedules for all program actions, in addition to the problem list. I insisted that the Program Manager be in charge of the review - I maintained the records of the proceedings and implemented schedule changes directed by the PM.  It became the central management system for SRAM. I was rewarded with a much longer work week when the RPV/ALSM commander asked for systems covering the 20 RPV programs. I was able to set up those review programs and complete a review cycle before my reassignment a few months later.

One of the colonels in RPV/ALSM was reassigned to be in charge of Program Control of the Phase IV Program in Alabama and had me selected against my will to that program.  I had been with RPV/ALSM less than a year but was due for a change of station. When I arrived, he assigned me to build a review system for Phase IV. Initially, most managers were opposed to having a review system. One colonel was a very active opponent. I built an open and honest system which benefited all program participants as well as supporting external organizations. Within a few months everyone in the program was an active and vocal supporter except for the noted colonel. One year after initiation, that colonel stood up at a meeting, spoke highly of the review system and congratulated himself for having developed it. Like right wingers everywhere, he believed in the big lie. (Why would he say something that ridiculous if it wasn't somehow true?)

I was the junior member of an independent Phase IV program review committee. In one session, we were told that the new commander wanted to make a substantial program change and wanted to use our "independent" recommendation as part of his justification. The committee recommended the change (9-1 vote) without any review. I pointed out the obvious ethics violation and was overruled (9-1 again). I made an appointment with the commander and explained to him that he couldn't call an ordered recommendation "independent". He claimed he didn't understand 'my problem'.

A few months later, the Air Force Auditor sent an investigator to look into program issues. In charge of all program documentation, I was ordered to stonewall the Auditor. Instead, I gave the Auditor my full cooperation. The Auditor's report was killed somewhere at the high levels of the AF.  However, someone (Not me. I never saw it.) sent a copy to Congressman Brooks of the House Government Operations Committee and he scheduled hearings to review the Phase IV Program. The Phase IV commander held a staff meeting and said that we would develop a defense that would include lies we could get away with. I met with him after and told him I would not participate in such an illegal operation. I advised him to develop and implement a get well plan to correct the problems the Auditor had uncovered and any others the Auditor had missed. He said he was under orders from a major general and couldn't refuse. I told him to follow my example. He excused me from participation in the cover-up. Congressman Brooks held the hearings. The major general was forced into retirement and the get well plan was developed and implemented. Of course, my subsequent effectiveness ratings were best described as "damned by faint praise".

I moved back to Wright Patterson AFB and was placed in charge of the Cruise Missile Independent Survivability Team. I determined that, despite high praise, the group had done nothing of any value and was not in position to do anything of value in the future. I refused to seek continued funding and insisted that the office be closed. It was, and I moved on, accompanied by more poor effectiveness ratings.

Just before my retirement, an in-house contractor proposed a task to me.  I considered it of little value and turned it down.  The contractor offered me a post retirement job if I were to change my decision.  I turned him down again accompanied with a verbal thrashing.  After retirement, I did not apply for work with any company with which I had had any connection.  I went to work for a company I had not heard of in my AF career.

Working as a software supervisor for a defense contractor, I received an invitation from a WPAFB program office to propose on the development of a contract data management software system. Two other companies offered to modify systems which they already had - one for $800,000 the other for $500,000. We didn’t have a system, but I proposed to build one for $70,000. The program office took no action. I got internal funding and my group developed the system and a companion configuration data management system for the $70,000. We sold a copy of the two systems to the program office for $70,000. We subsequently provided these systems to a score or more other program offices.  These systems became standard throughout the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) and several other Air Force system development centers around the country.

An Air Force laboratory recognized that it had a serious problem after failing to have any control of the use of hazardous chemicals for many years.  There were many unlabeled bottles, known chemicals in improper storage, and a high potential that explosive combinations of chemicals were stored together.  Our company was on contract for $600,000 to solve the problem.  A small part of the contract was to develop a database program to track the storage of chemicals after location, identification, and re-storage or disposal and consolidate with chemical handling information sheets.  A key scientist insisted on our buying software which had chemical bond drawing capability for $450,000.  It would have to be supplemented to do the required tracking.  I was thrown into the fray. I laid out the project requirements and alternatives and briefed it to the lab officials.  The scientist became very animated insisting on the bonding software, but he was overruled.  The scientist appealed the decision twice and we had two more meetings with the same result.  Usually, when you lay out the requirements in a clear concise manner, the connivers don't argue.  This scientist was used to getting his way and couldn't make himself believe that, because he was wrong, he was going to lose.

Later, I worked as a software developer for the DoD Material Management Standard System (MMSS). Like many large government software projects, it was bound to fail from the start. If it had been funded at perhaps $10 million, it might well have succeeded. However, it was funded at $800 million. So, it started life with a large ungainly bureaucracy fully capable of suffocating any progress. Other elements such as the lack of a common data base and no standards for system development applied redundant assurance of failure. The program closed after two years. The money was spent and nothing of value had been accomplished. Neither I nor anyone else could save that program but the experience will be of value in Congress.  MMSS was the third failure of the same development.  Now I hear that the Air Force is going to try it again with a program called ERS.  This time it is funded at $1.2 billion!!